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BARBARA EMEHY, a Minor., etc., et al., Appellants, v.
BUEL E. EMERY et al., Respondents.

)

[1] Automobiles-L.:.w Governing.-Whether a complaint states a
cause of action for injuries sustained in an automobile accident in Idaho is governed by Idaho law.
[2] Id.-Pleading-Reck.1ess Disregard of Rights of Others.-If a
complaint states causes of action for "wilful misconduct"
within the meaning of the California guest statute (Veh. Code,
§ 403), it also states causes of action for conduct in "reckless
disregard of the rights of others" within the meaning of the
Idaho guest statute (Idaho Code, § 49-1001).
[8] Negligence-Wilful Misconduct.-Wilful misconduct depends
on the facts of a particular case and necessarily involves deliberate, intentional or wanton conduct in doing or omitting
to perform acts, with knowledge or appreciation of the fact,
on the part of the culpable person, that danger is likely to
result therefrom.
[4] Id.-Wilful Misconduct.-Wilful misconduct implies at least
the intentional doing of something either with a knowledge
that serious injury is a probable (as distinguished from a
possible) result, or the intentional doing of an act with a
wanton and reckless disregard of its possible result.
[5] Automobiles - Pleading - Wilful Misconduct.-A complaint
by minor children against their father and minor brother for
injuries sustained in an automobile accident sufficiently alleges
wilful misconduct on the part of the father and brother where
it is alleged that the brother was an unskilled driver, that
immediately before the accident he was "sleepy and drowsy"
and had not had any sleep for more than 24 hours, that for
a long period of time and many miles of travel before the
accident he drove at high and excessive rates of speed on a
road that was narrow and unfamiliar to him, that the foregoing facts were known to the father, that the brother drove
under these circumstances with the consent and under the
direction of the father, and that the brother fell asleep "while
said car was traveling at said high and excessive rates of
speed, and lost control thereof, causing said car to roll over."

[3] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 8 j Am. Jur., Negligence, § 48.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles, § 174a; [2, 5] Automobiles, §180a; [3,4] Negligence, §8j [6,7] Conflict of taws,
§ 13 j [8-11, 19] Parent and Child, § 3; [12, 13, 15, 17] Infants,
. § 4; [14] Automobiles, §§ 123(3), 123(4); [16] Parent and Child,
§ 2; [IS] Husband and Wife, § 65(1).
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[6] Conflicts of Laws - '.r.orts.-In an action by minor children
against their father and minor brother for injuries sustained
in an automobile accident in Idaho, the question whether the
father and brother are immune from liability to plaintiffs,
is one of capacity to sue and be sued, and as to that question
• the place of injury is both fortuitous and irrelevant.
[7] Id.-Torts.-Disabilities to sue and immunities from suit because of a family relationship are more properly determined
by reference to the law of the state of the family domicile,
since that state has the primary responsibility for establishing
and regulating the incidents of the family relationship, and
since it is undesirable that the rights, duties, disabilities and
immunities conferred or imposed by such relationship should
constantly change as members of the family cross state boundaries during temporary absences from home.
[8] Parent and Child-Parental Immunity From Tort Liability.The modern trend of decisions is to mitigate the rule of absolute immunity from responsibility of a parent for wilful and
malicious torts to his minor child.
[9] Id.-Parental Immunity From Tort Liability.-Preservation
of the parent's right to discipline his minor children has been
the basic policy behind the rule of parental immunity from
tort liability.
[10] Id.-Parental Immunity From Tort Liability.-Since the law
imposes on the parent a duty to rear and discipline his child
and confers the right to prescribe a course of reasonable conduct for its development, the parent has a wide discretion
in the performance of his parental functions, but that discretion does not include the right wilfully to inflict personal injuries beyond the limits of reasonable parental discipline, and
no sound public policy would be subserved by extending it
beyond those limits.
[11] Id.-Actions by Child Against Parent.-A child, like every
other individual, has a right to freedom from wilful or
malicious misconduct, and hence may sue his parent for a
wilful or malicious tort.
[12] Infants - Liability for Torts. - Exceptions to the general
principle of liability of minors for their torts (Civ. Code,
§ 41) arc not to be lightly created, and no exception to liability of a minor brother for torts to his minor sisters should
be allowed on the speculative assumption that to do so would
preserve the family.
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d. Conflict of Laws, § 79 et seq.; Am.Jur., Conflict of Laws, § 180 et seq.
[11] See Cal.Jur., Parent aud Child, § 6; Am.Jur., Parent and
Child, §§ 48, 88 et 8eq.
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[13] Id. - Liability for Torts.-The mere possibility that tort
actions between minor brothers and sisters will encourage
fraud and collusion because ~f the possible existence of liability insurance does not warrant immunity from liability
where it would otherwise exist, and the interest of the
child in freedom from personal injury caused by the tortious
conduct of others is sufficient to outweigh any danger of
fraud or collusion.
[14] Automobiles-Oare as to Guests - Intoxication and Wilful
Misconduct.-The guest statute (Veh. Code, § 403), which
was enacted to protect owners and operators of vehicles from
fraudulent claims of those riding as guests, grants the owner
or operator of a vehicle absolute immunity from liability for
injuries proximately resulting from negligence in operation
of the vehicle, and since the Legislature considered that the
immunity thus granted was sufficient to protect the ownel'
and operator from fraudulent claims, it is improper for the
Supreme Court to extend that immunity further in a particular class of cases to claims for injuries proximately resulting
from the operator's wilful misconduct or intoxication.
[15] Infants-Liability for Torts.-Tort actions between minor
brothers and sisters will not impair their parents' exercise
of their disciplinary functions.
[16] Parent and Ohild-Liability of Parent for Torts of Ohild.A parent is not ordinarily vicariously liable fer the torts of
his minor child, and a minor child's property is his own and
not that of his parents. (Civ. Code, § 203.)
[17] Infants-Liability for Torts.-The possibility of a minor defendant's succession by intestacy to the damages recovered
from him by a minor brother or sister is too remote and
speCUlative as a basis on which to found the rule of immunity from suit by one against the other.
[18] Husband and Wife-Oommunity Propsrty-Damages for Personal Injuries.-In action by mother of minor children against
their father and minor brother for medical and other expenses
incurred as the result of an automobile accident, the pleading
against her husband is defective since a cause of action for
damages suffered by the parents because of injury to their
minor children is community property, and the husband's
alleged wilful misconduct is imputable to her.
[19] Parent and Ohild-Plcading.-In action by mother of minor
children against their father and minor brother for medical
and other expenses incurred as the result of an automobile
accident, the pleading against her minor son is defective where
it fails to comply with the requirements of Code Civ. Proe.,
§ 376, relating to actions by parents of child for injuriea
and to nonjoinder of one parent as plainti1L
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. Herbert C. Kaufman,
Judge. Reversed.
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained as a
result of an automobile accident. Judgment for defendants
reversed.
J. Oscar Goldstein, P. M. Barceloux, Burton J. Goldstein,
Goldstein, Barceloux & Goldstein and Robert J. Cort for
Appellants.
Worthington, Park & Worthington and Ronsia W. Fields
for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs Barbara and Joyce Emery, unemancipated minor daughters of plaintiff Esther Emery and
defendant Buel Emery, brought this action to recover for
personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident that
occurred in the State of Idaho. At the time of the accident,
Barbara and Joyce were riding as guests in an automobile
owned by Buel and driven by defendant James Emery, their
unemancipated minor brother. Esther, appearing individually, alleges that she is responsible for the support, maintenance, and medical care of Barbara and Joyce and attempts
to state a separate cause of action to recover for medical,
nursing, hospital, and other care furnished Barbara and
Joyce. Judgment for defendants was entered on an order
sustaining, without leave to amend, defendants' general demurrer to plaintiffs' second amended complaint. Plaintiffs
appeal.
The first question presented on appeal is whether Barbara
and Joyce have alleged facts l sufficient to constitute causes
'The relevant paragraphs of the complaint are as follows:

"VII
"That on or about the 18th day of June, 1952, at approximatel,.
9 :30 A. M., on said public highway 99, about twenty-eight miles west
of Idaho Falls, in the State of Idaho, the Plaintiff was riding as a
guest in a certain 1939 Pontiac Automobile, California license plate,
being driven, operated and maintained by the Defendant, JAMES BUEL
EMERY as the agent, servant and employee of the Defendant BUEL E.
EMERY, that the said BUEL E. EMERY is the legal registered OMler of
said 1939 Pontiac automobile, California license plate.

"VIII
"That at all times herein mentioned defendant JAMES BUZL EMERY
was a minor of the age of seventeen (17) yenrs; thnt at time and place
bereinafter and her~J.)e!ore mentioned; said uWl.Ol' WtfeJldant J.uo:a

)
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of action against defendants, assuming that the latter are not
immune from suit because of their family relationship to these
plaintiffs. [1] Since the accident occurred in the State of
Idaho, the law of that state is determinative of the answer
to this question. (Grant v. illcAuHffe, 41 Ca1.2d 859, 862
[264 P.2d 944] ; Lomnger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362, 366-367
[10 P.2d 63, 84 A.IJ.R. 1264].) The applicable Idaho statute
provides, "No person transported by the owner or operator
of a motor vehicle as his guest without paying for such transportation shall have a cause of action for damages against
such owner or operator for injuries, death or loss, in case of
accident, unless such accident shall have been intentional
had only been driving for a short period of time and was
an unskilled and inexperienced driver and unaccustomed to driving during
the times, in the places and under the circumstances hereinbefore and
hereinafter mentioned; all of which facts were known to the Defendant
BUEL EMERY

BUEL E. EMERY.

"IX
"That at said time, place and direction, as aforesaid the Defendants
JAMES B. EMERY and BUEL E. EMERY were guilty of wilful misconduct;
that said wilful misconduct consisted of the following acts under the
following existing circumstances: That Defendant BUEL E. EMERY, the
father of the minor Defendant JAMES B. EMERY, directed the said minor
Defendant JAMES B. EMERY to drive that certain 1939 Pontiac automobile, California license plate, knowing that the said Defendant JAMES B.
EMERY was sleepy and drowsy and had not had any sleep for a long
period of time in excess of twenty-four hours; that the said Defendant
JAMES B. EMERY did for many miles and for a long period of time prior
to and during said accident, drive at high and excessive rates of speed,
with the knowledge and consent of his father, the said Defendant BUEL E.
EMERY; that the said defendant BUEL E. EMERY, the father of the
minor defendant JAMES BUEL EMERY, directed the said minor defendant
JAMES BUEL EMERY to drive that certain 1939 Pontiac automobile, California license plate, knowing that the said minor Defendant JAMES BUEL
EMERY was an unskilled driver and unaccustomed to driving during the
times, in the places and under the circumstances hereinbefore and hereinafter mentioned: that said Defendant BUEL E. EMERY knew that the
said road was in a dangerous condition in that said road had dirt and
gravel on either side and was only a 2-1ane highway; that while the
minor Defendant JAMES BUEL EMERY was so operating said aforementioned automobile, said minor Defendant JAMES BUEL EMERY fell asleep
at the wheel of said car while said car was travelling at said high and
excessive rates of speed, and lost control thereof, causing said car to
roll over; that all of the aforementioned wilful misconduct of the defendants took place with a complete disregard of and indifference to the
great possibility of injuring the persons riding in the car tllat defendants
were operating, including the plaintiff herein, and with full knowledge
of the dangers involved; and that as a direct and proximate result of
said wilful misconduct on the part of the defendants as aforementio:tJ.eJ
the said 1939 Pontiac automobile, California license plates, did at the
aforementioned time and place and direction leave the highway and roll
over as aforementioned, causing the plaintiff to sustain severe. serious
aud permanent injuries &13 hereinafter set forth."
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on the part of said owner or operator or caused by his intoxication or his reckless disregard of the rights of others."
(Idaho Code, § 49-1001.)
The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted the term "reckless disregard" ill that statute as u('scribing conduct that is
110t necessarily as culpable as that described by the words
"wilful misconduct" as us('d in section 403 of the California
Vehicle Code. 2 (Mason v. Mootz, 73 Idaho 461 [253 P.2d
240, 2431 ; Hughes v. Hudelson, 67 Idaho 10 l169 P.2d 712,
716].) [2] A fortiori, if the complaint states causes of
action for "wilful misconduct" within the meaning of the
California statute it also states causes of action for conduct
in "reckless uisregard of the rights of others" within the
meaning of the Idaho statute.
[3] "'Wilful misconduct uepends upon the facts of a particular case and necessarily involves deliberate, intentional
or wanton conduct in uoing or om itting to perform acts, with
knowledge or appr('ciation of the fact, on the part of the
culpable persoll, that danger is likely to result therefrom.
[Citations.] " (Norton v. Puter, 138 Cal.App. 253, 258 [32
P.2d 172], quoted with approval in Parsons v. Fuller, 8 Cal.
2d 463, 468 [66 P.2d 430].) [4] "'Wilful misconduct
implies at least the intentional doing of something either with
a knowledge that serious injury is a probable (as distinguished
from a possible) result, or the intentional doing of an act
with a wanton and reckless disr('gard of its poss'ible result.' "
(Meek v. Fowler, 3 Ca1.2d 420, 426 [45 P.2d 194], quoted
with approval in Mercer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com.,
40 Ca1.2d 102, 118 (251 P.2d 955].) In Parsons v. Fuller,
supra, it was held that the evidence, which showed that the
defendant had "persisted" in driving at an excessive rate
of speeu "for some hours and over many miles of travel,
after repeated protests on the part of his guest, and while
travelling over a mountaiu road with frequent curves . . .,"
was sufficient to show wilful misconduct. (8 Ca1.2d at 465.)
In that case the court said, " 'To us it seems clear that one
who, while driving an automobile, knowingly flirts with
." No person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle upon a highway without giving compensation for ::Iuch ride, nor any other person,
has any right of action for civil damages a~:.l.inst the driver of such
vehicle or against any other person legally liable for the conduct of such
driver on account of personal injury to or the death of such guest during
such ride, unless the plaintiff in nlly such nction c:::talilishcs that such
injury or death proximately resulted from the iutol'ication or wilful
misconduct of liuch driver."
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danger and, without nt>cC'l';sity or emergency compelling him,
"takes a chance" on killing or injuring himself or others,
who may be so unfortunate as t9 be riding with him, is guilty
of wilful misconduct.'" (Ibid., at 468-469.) [5] In the present case it is alleged in the complaint (sec footnote 1, supra)
that James was an unskilled driver, that immediately before
the accident he was "sleepy and drowsy" and had not had any
sleep for more than 24 hours, that for a long period of time
and many miles of travel before the accident he drove at
high and excessive rates of speed on a road that was narrow
and unfamiliar to him, that the foregoing facts were known
to Buel, that James drove under these circumstances with
the consent and under the direction of Buel, that James feU
asleep "while said car was travelling at said high and excessive rates of speed, and lost control thereof, causing said
car to roll over. . . . " Applying the foregoing principles,
we conclude that the complaint adequately alleges wilful
misconduct on the part of James and Bue) and thus that
the minor plaintiffs have stated causes of action against
defendants, assuming that the latter are not immune from suit
because of their family relationship to the minor plaintiffs.
[6] To determine whether Buel and James are immune
from liability to Barbara and Joyce for tIle torts alleged
in the complaint, it is first necessary to decide whether that
question should be determined by the law of California or
that of Idaho. This choice of law problem is one of first
impression in this state. The possible choices in cases like
the present one are three: the law of the place where the
injury occurred, the law of the forum, and the law of the
state in which the family is domiciled. We are aware of
only two reported cases on the precise question presented.
In Ball v. Ball. - - 'Vyo. - - [269 P.2d302, 304], the
Supreme Court of \Vyoming applied the law of the place
(Montana) where the injury occurred to determine this question. It is not, however, a question of tort hut one of capacity
to sue and be sued 8 and as to that question the place of injury
is both fortuitous and irrelevant. In Fowlkes v. Ray-O-Vae,
52 Ga.App. 338, 340 [183 S.E. 210], the Court of Appeals
of Georgia held that in actions between a minor child and
its parent the "law of the forum governs as to the parties
<.

8The parent's immunity, if any, from tort liability is based on the
minor child's disability to sue rather than on the absence of a violated
duty. (See Worrel; v. Wo<rrell, 174 Va. 11, 23, 27 f4 S.E.2d 342].
Dun14p v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 372 [150 A. UOJ, 71 A.L.R. 1055].)
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and the right to sue." In a somewhat analogous situation,
many courts have held in tort actions between husbands and
wives that questbns of capacity to sue and be sued should
be governed by the law of the forum. (See Ford, InterspousaZ
J,iqbility for A.utomobile Accidents in the Oonflict of Laws,
15 U.Pitts.L.Rev. 397, 419, and cases cited.) It should
be noted, however, that in many of these cases, as in Fowlkes
v. Ray-O-Vae, supra, the state of the forum was also the state
of the domicile. Although tort actions between members
of the same family will ordinarily be brought in the state
of the family domicile, the courts of another state will
in some cases be a more convenient forum.< and thus the
question arises whether the choice of law rule should be
expressed in terms of the law of the forum or that of the
domicile. [7] ''IV e think that disabilities to sue and immunities from suit because of a family relationship are more
properly determined by reference to the law of the state
of the family domicile. That state has the primary responsibility for establishing and regulating the incidents of the
family relationship and it is the only state in which the
parties can, by participation in the legislative processes,
effect a chauge in those incidents. Moreover, it is undesirable that the rights, duties, disabilities, and immunities
conferred or imposed by the family relationship should constantly change as members of the family cross state boundaries
during temporary absences from their home. Since all of
the parties to the present case are apparently domiciliaries
of California, we must look to the law of this state to determine whether any disabilities or immunities exist.
Defendants contend that Trudell v. Leatherby, 212 Cal.
678 [300 P. 7], and Myers v. Tranquillity 1rr. Dist., 26 Cal.
App.2d 385 [79 P.2d 419], are controlling on the question
of Bnc! 's immunity to suit by his unemancipated minor daughters, Barbara and Joyce. In Trudell v. Leatherby it was
stated that a " 'minor child has no right of action against
a parent for the tort of the latter'" (212 Cal. at 680), but
plaintiff points out that both Trudell v. Leatherby and Myers
v. Tranquillity Irr. Dist. illvolved actions for injuries caused
by the parent's negligence, whereas in the present case Barbara and Joyce state causes of action for wilful misconduct.
To sustain their contentioll, plaintiffs cite a number of cases
from other jurisdictions holding that, although a parent is
not responsible to his minor child for negligence. he is responsible for wilful and malicious torts. (Wright v. Wright,
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85 Ga.App. 721 [70 S.E.2d 152, 155-156] [wilful misconduct] ;
Treschman v. Trescliman, 28 Iud.App. 206, 210-212 [61 N.E.
961] [assault and battery] j gi!mbab v. Siembab. 202 l\Iisc.
1053, 1056 L112 N.Y.S.2d 82] [wilful misconduct] j Meyer v.
Ritterbush, 196 Misc. 551, 554 [92 N.Y.S.2d 595] [wilful misconduct], aff'd 276 App.Div. 972 [94 N.Y.S.2d 620] ; Mahnke
v. MOO1'e, 197 Md. 61, 68 [77 A.2d 923] [intentional mental
cruelty] j Dix v. Martin, 171 Mo.App. 266, 274 [157 S.\V.
133] [assault] j Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Orf'. 282, 293-301 [218
P.2d 445] [wilful misconduct] j see also Cannon v. Cannon,
287 N.Y. 425, 429 [40 N.E.2d 236]; Baker v. Baker, 364
Mo. 453 [263 S.'V.2d 29, 30-31] j Levesque v. Levesque,
99 N.H. 147 [106 A.2d 563, 564]; Matarese v. Matarese,
47 R.I. 131, 134 [131 A.198, 42 A.L.R. 1360] j .t1boussie v.
Abollssie, (Tex.Civ.App.) 270 S.W.2d 636, 639; Brumfield
v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 583 [74 S.E. 170] j Securo v.
Securo, 110 Vl.Va. 1, 2 [156 S.E. 750].)
[8] Although thf're are no California cases involving an
action by a minor child against its parent for a wilful or
malicious tort, the modern trend of decisions (see anno. 19
A.L.R.2d 423, 427 and cases cited; Prosser on Torts [2d ed.]
675-677; Davis v. Smith (E.D.Pa.), 126 F.Supp. 497, 502-506
and cases cited; Dunla.p v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352 [150 A. 905] j
Borst v. Borst, 41 Wn.2d 642, 647-654 l251 P.2d 149] and
cases cited; 29 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1302; 39 Va.L.Rev. 389) is
to mitigate the rule of absolute immunity established by the
early cases of Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703 [9 So. 885,
13 L.R.A. 682] [false imprisonment of minor child in an
insane asylum], and Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242 [79 P. 788,
107 Am.St.Rep. 805, 3 Ann. Cas. 1, 68 L.R.A. 893] [rape of
a minor child by her father]. The rationale of the cases
refusing to extend immunity to the parent for wilful or
malicious torts against his minor children is that the lack
of such immunity does not conflict with or inhibit reasonable
parental discipline. (See Cowgill v. Boock. supra., 189 Ore.
282, 293, 297-298; Borst v. Borst, supra, 41 vVn.2d 642, 656;
McCurdy, "Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations,"
43 Harv.L.Rev. 1030, 1079; 64 Harv.L.Rev. 1208.)
[9] Preservation of the parent's right to discipline his
minor children has been the basic policy behind the rule
of parental immunity from tort liability. (Sf'e McCvrdy,
s'upm, 43 Harv.L.Rev. ]030, 1076-1077.) [10] Since th(>
law impos(>s on the parcnt a (luty to rear and discipline his
child and eonfel's the right to prescribe a course of reaSOll-
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able conduct for its development, the parent has a wide discretion in the performance of his parental functions, but that
discretion does not include the right wilfully to inflict personal
injuries beyond the limits of reasonable parental discipline.
No sound public policy would be subserved by extending
it· beyond those limits. \Vhile it may seem repugnant to
allow a minor to sue his parent, we think it more repugnant
to leave a minor child without redress for the damage he
has suffered by reason of his parent's wilful or malicious
misconduct. [11] A child, like every other individual, has
a right to freedom from such injury. Accordingly, we
conclude that an unemancipated minor may sue his parent
for a wilful or malicious tort, and thus that Buel is not
immune from suit for the ('a uses of action pleaded by Barbara
and Joyce in the complaint in the present action.
In support of their contention that .1 ames is not immune
from suit, plaintiffs Barbara and Joyce cite Rozell v. Rozell,
281 N.Y. 106 [22 N.E.2d 254. 123 A.L.R. 1015], in which
the New York Court of Appeals held that an action was
maintainable by a 12-year-old boy ag-ainst his I6-year-old
sister for injuries sustained while riding in an automobile
negligently operated by her. (See also Munsert v. Farmers
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 229 ·Wis. 581. 586 [281 N.W. 671];
Beilke v. Knaack, 207 \Vis. 490, 493-494 [242 N.W. 176J.)
Although defendants concede that the few reported cases
involving this question all support plaintiffs' contention that
actions between minor brothers and sisters are maintainable,
they nevertheless argue that those eases are unsound and
should not be followed by this court. They contend that
to allow tort actions to be maintained between minor brothers
and sisters will (1) disrupt the family harmony, (2) encourage fraud and collusion, (3) impair the parents' exercise
of their disciplinary functions, (4) result in an uneven distribution of the family resources, and (5) encourage useless
litigation since there is a possibility that the minor defendant
will live to inherit the mOlley recovered from him by
the minor plaintiff. These arguments are not persuasive.
[12] Exceptions to the general principle of liability (Civ.
Code, § 3523 [" For every wrong there is a remedy.' '] )
of minors for their torts (Civ. Code, § 41 ; Ellis v. D'Angelo,
116 Ca1.App.2d 310. 313-315 [253 P.2U 675J) are not to be
lightly created, and we ucclille to create such an exception
on the basis of the speculative assumption that to do so would
preserve family harmony. An uncompensated tort is no
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more apt to promote or preserve peace in the family than
is an action between minor brother and sister to recover
damages for that tort. Furthermore, the relationship between brother and sister is not complicated by reciprocal
rights and obligations of the kind that characterize the relationships of husband and wife and parent and child and that
lend some support to the immunities from tort liability that
ha ve been recognized in such cases.
[13] Defendants' second argument, that tort actions between minor brothers and sisters will encourage fraud and
collusion, is based on assumptions opposite from those on
which their first argument is based. This argument assumes
that the action is not in reality directQd against the minor
brother or sister of the plaintiff, but is in fact directed at
his liability insurer. If this assumption is correct, maintenance of such a tort action would not disturb the family peace
and harmony; on the contrary, the "domestic harmony will
not be disrupted so much by allowing the action as by denying it." (Prosser on Torts [2d ed.] 677.) Moreover, although defendants' statement that the existence of insurance,
of which there is no evidence in the present case, "gives no
cause of action where one did not exist before" is correct,
by the same token the mere possibility of fraud or collusion
because of the possible existence of liability insurance does
not warrant immunity from liability where it would otherwise exist. The interest of the child in freedom from personal injury caused by the tortious conduct of others is
sufficient to outweigh any danger of fraud or collusion.
As the Supreme Court of Washington said in reply to
the same argument in a case involving an analogous situ aation [action by a child to recover for injuries caused by
its parent's negligent operation of a truck for business purposes], "The courts may and should take cognizance of fraud
and collusion when found to exist in a particular case.
However, the fact that there may be greater opportunity
for fraud or collusion in one class of cases than another
does not warrant courts of law in closing the door to all
cases of that class. Courts must depend upon the efficacy
of the judicial processes to ferret out the meritorious from
the fraudulent in particular cases. Rozell v. Rozell, supra.
If those processes prove inadequate, the problem becoines
one for the Legislature. See Signs v. ~~igns, supra [156
Ohio St. 566 (103 N.E.2<.l 743)]. Courts will not immunize
tortfeasors from liability in a whole class of cases because
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of the possibility of fraud, but will depend upon the Legislature to deal with the problem as a question of public
policy." (BoTst v. Borst, supra, 41 \Vn.2d 642, 653-654.)
[14] In California, the Legislature has dealt with the probleIQ.. Our guest statute (Veh. Code, § 403), which was
enacted to protcct owners and operators of vehicles from
fraudulent claims of those riding as guests (lVeber v. Pinyan,
9 Ca1.2d 226, 229 [70 P.2d 183, 112 A.L.R. 407]), grants the
owner and operator of a vellicle absolute immunity from
liability for injuries proximately resulting from negligence
in the opcration of the vehicle. Since the Legislature obviously considered that the immunity thus granted was
sufficient to protect the owner and operator from fraudulent
claims, we think it improper for this court to extend that
immunity further in a particular class of cases to claims for
injuries proximately resulting from the operator's wilful
misconduct or intoxication.
[15] Although defendants contend that to allow tort actions between minor brothers and sistcrs will impair their
parents' exercise of their disciplinary functions, they fail to
make clear how that impairment will take place and we see no
substance in the contention. Similarly, the contention that to
allow a sister to recover a judgmcnt against her brother will
result in an uneven distribution of the family resources is
without merit. [16] A parent is not ord inarily vicariously
liable for the torts of his minor child (lV eber v. Pinyan, 9
Ca1.2d 226, 235 [70 P.2d 183, 112 A.L.R. 407] ; Martin v.
Barrett, 120 Cal.App.2d 625, 628 [261 P.2d 551]; Ellis v.
D'Angelo, S1£pra, 116 Cal.App.2d 310, 317), and a minor
child's property is his own and not that of his parents.
(Estate of Yano, 188 Cal. 645, 649 [206 P. 995] ; Civ. Code,
§ 202.) [17] Finally, we think that the p:>ssibility of a
minor defendant's succession by intestacy to the damages
recovered from him by a minor brother or sister is too remote
and speculative a basis on which to found the rule of immunity for which defendant contends. (See McCurdy, supra,
43 Harv.L.Rev. 1030, 1073.) Accordingly, we conclude
that Barbara and Joyce may maintain the present action
against their minor brother, James.
In the third cause of action pleaded in the complaint
Esther, the mother of the minor plaintiffs, attempts to recover
for the expenses incurred in caring for and treating the
injuries receiycd. by the minor plaintiffs. [18] Insofar as
that cause of action is pleaded against her husband, Buel,
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the pleading is defective since a cause of action for damages
suffered by the parents because of injury to their minor
child is community property-(Flores v. Brown, 39 Ca1.2d
622,630 L248 P.2d 922]) and Bue] 's alleged wilful misconduct
is imputable to Esther. (Ibid.) [19] Insofar as Esther
attempts to state a cause of action against her minor son,
James, the pleading is defective since it fails to comply with
the requirements of section 376 of the Code of Civil procedure.·
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Spence, J., concUl'red.

